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Train control systems ensure the safety of railways. This paper begins with a summary of the typical 
train control systems in Japan and Europe. Based on this summary, the author then raises the following 
question regarding current train control systems: What approach should be adopted in order to enhance 
the functionality, safety, and reliability of train control systems and assist in commercial operations on 
railways? Next, the author provides a desirable architecture that is likely to assist with the development 
of new train control systems based on current information and communication technologies. A new 
unified train control system (UTCS) is proposed that is effective in enhancing the robustness and com-
petitiveness of a train control system. The ultimate architecture of the UTCS will be only composed of 
essential elements such as point machines and level crossing control devices in the field. Finally, a pro-
cessing method of the UTCS is discussed.
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1. Introduction
Many train control systems have been developed and intro-
duced to date. Although such systems have been invented in 
compliance with the railway requirements of the countries and 
railway lines for which they were developed, as well as in accord-
ance with the technologies available at the time, they have a com-
mon fundamental architecture. More specifically, such systems 
are manufactured from fundamental components, including block 
systems for controlling train-to-train spacing for trains running 
between stations and traffic direction control in a single-track 
section, automatic train protection (ATP) systems affiliated to the 
block systems, and interlocking devices for performing route con-
trol in station premises.
The systems vary depending on how they perform train detec-
tion and how they realize ATP. However, although these systems 
range from low-safety systems with only an automatic warning 
system (AWS) to the most advanced radio train control systems 
(communication-based train control (CBTC) systems), they are the 
same in that interlocking devices are responsible for route control 
and safety assurance for trains running in station premises.
Current train control systems, which have gone through con-
tinuous improvements as described above, constitute solid sys-
tems composed of many hardware devices and subsystems. The 
key question is: What approach should be adopted in order to 
enhance the functionality, safety, and reliability of train control 
systems and assist in commercial operations on railways? Rather 
than persisting with conventional architectures, I have spent con-
siderable time pondering desirable architectures that are likely 
to assist in the development of new train control systems based 
on current information and communication technologies. Among 
these architectures, I propose a new unified train control system 
(UTCS), in which all safety devices are regarded as devices for se-
curing train paths so that trains are informed of an available path 
through unified processing by a common processor placed at the 
center. A description of the background story and advantages of 
the UTCS follows.
2. The evolution of train control systems in Japan
In Japan’s ATP systems, automatic train stop (ATS) control, in 
which the driver’s brake operation is given priority so that the 
train is forced to stop if the situation is determined to be danger-
ous, is differentiated from automatic train control (ATC), in which 
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the brake operation itself is automated with a system to prevent 
train accidents from occurring due to the driver’s negligence. 
Hence, the evolution of Japan’s ATP systems will be surveyed in 
comparison with Euro-American ATP systems in order to examine 
the requirements for the UTCS.
2.1. From automatic warning system (AWS) to automatic train stop 
(ATS)
In its early days, ATS began with the development of an AWS 
that was intended to prevent negligence in brake handling by 
notifying the driver of stop signals. The Mikawashima train crash 
that occurred in 1962 was a large-scale accident caused by a driver 
not only driving through a stop signal but also breaking through 
a safety siding, resulting in derailment, obstruction of the adja-
cent line, and 160 casualties. ATS was developed to prevent such 
accidents. It notifies the train of a stop signal from the ground in 
order to call it to the attention of the driver using an alarm sound 
(bell), as well as automatically actuating emergency braking, 
unless the driver responds with a confirmation operation within 
5 s, irrespective of the issued alarm sound. This device, called the 
S-type ATS, can be regarded as the least functional backup device 
that has evolved from the AWS. The Japanese National Railways 
(JNR) decided to install ATSs of this type in all railway lines and 
completed installation in 1966. Although this device contribut-
ed to a great reduction in the number of accidents, ATS was far 
from a perfect system because it still could not prevent accidents 
caused by delayed brake handling and so forth after the confir-
mation operation. (Note that the “confirmation operation” means 
that the brake handle is shifted to the brake position, and the 
confirmation button is pressed.)
2.2. Instruction from the Ministry of Transport and advanced ATS of 
private-sector railways
In January 1967, one year after the JNR reported that the in-
stallation of ATS was completed on all JNR lines, the Ministry of 
Transport (currently the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans-
port, and Tourism) issued a notification (Government Notice No. 
11) that obligated public-sector/private-sector railway companies 
to install ATS systems. Unlike the JNR’s S-type ATS that was devel-
oped assuming the confirmation operation, this type of ATS could 
provide some speed check function. As a result of this notifica-
tion, ATS was advanced one step further, in that no alarm sound 
was issued as long as normal operation was performed, and 
braking was actuated only if the result of a speed check indicated 
danger.
In response to the notification from the Ministry of Transport, 
public-sector/private-sector railway companies developed and 
introduced an ATS system in accordance with their individual 
conditions. Typical ATSs of the speed check type employed by 
public-sector/private-sector railways are as follows [1]:
(1) Speed is checked on the basis of the time that the train 
takes to pass two ground coils placed on the ground.
(2) A continuous speed check pattern is selected on the basis 
of ground coil information in order to continuously check the 
train speed until the train stops.
(3) A modulation signal corresponding to the speed to be 
checked is transmitted to the track circuit and is checked against 
the train speed.
(4) The track circuit current is instantaneously interrupted for 
a certain period of time according to the speed to be checked, in 
order to check the running speed.
2.3. ATSs capable of delivering train performance
While the JNR’s S-type ATS was plagued by accidents due to 
driver failure after the confirmation operation, various other ATSs 
developed by public-sector/private-sector railway companies in 
accordance with the notification from the Ministry of Transport 
demonstrated their effects without bringing about severe acci-
dents. Against the backdrop of this situation, in the early 1970s, 
the JNR started to examine how to realize ATSs that were as supe-
rior in functionality as those used by private-sector railway com-
panies. However, the hardest task was to develop an ATS system 
that could be commonly applied to railway lines where trains 
that greatly differed in brake performance, from limited express 
trains to freight trains, ran together at high density. Conversely, 
the brake performances of trains running in applicable railway 
lines of public-sector/private-sector railways were almost identi-
cal, so that controlling trains even on the basis of a uniform speed 
check did not cause a major problem.
To solve this difficult problem of developing an ATS that could 
be applied to railway lines where trains with greatly differing 
brake performances ran together, the JNR decided to provide in-
formation on the distance to the stop signal, rather than perform-
ing speed control from the ground. This was a novel idea, in that 
a speed check pattern according to distance information from the 
ground is generated by counting the brake performance on the 
train. This system was named the P-type ATS.
Because the P-type ATS could generate a speed check pattern 
according to the brake performance, not only could the most rea-
sonable speed check be realized for each train, but also unwanted 
braking could be avoided. Furthermore, because the P-type ATS 
used a transponder, which is a device capable of transmitting 
multiple items of data bi-directionally, it possessed three advan-
tages listed as follows. Using the P-type ATS, it became possible:
•	To	perform	protection	in	response	to	stop	signal	aspects;
•	To	perform	control	by	notifying	the	train	of	information	ac-
cording	to	speed	restriction	points;	and
•	To	perform	detailed	level	crossing	control	by	the	use	of	pass-
ing/stopping information from the train.
In addition, the concept employed in the P-type ATS—that is, 
control information from the ground being given to the train, just 
like information about simple running limit points, so that highly 
effective train control could be performed by counting data stored 
on the train—enormously influenced subsequent train control, 
such as digital ATC. Digital ATC and the P-type ATS have another 
advantage in that it is not necessary to upgrade the system even 
if the train speed is enhanced.
A key factor in the development of the UTCS is what informa-
tion	should	be	transmitted	to	the	train;	the	UTCS	to	be	developed	
needs to fully deliver train performance on the basis of actual 
achievements in the P-type ATS and digital ATC.
2.4. Emergence and advancement of automatic train control (ATC)
ATS is a human-centered system in which the driver primarily 
operates the train according to signals, and the brake is actuated 
in the event of a dangerous situation. In subways and Shinkansen 
trains, where it is difficult to install a ground signal, ATC is em-
ployed, which totally mechanizes brake control for safety without 
entrusting it to human determination. The first ATC employed a 
method in which a speed signal (an ATC signal) that is made to 
flow through rails is received by an on-board antenna, and an on-
board ATC device then compares the actual speed with the speed 
signal value. If the actual speed is higher, the brake is automati-
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2.5. Features of train control systems in Europe
Typical train control systems in Europe include the French 
transmission voie-machine (TVM) (TVM-300 and TVM-400), the 
German Linienzugbeeinflussung (LZB), and the European Train 
Control System (ETCS), as Europe-wide specifications. Although 
these systems are important in ensuring the safety of modern 
high-speed railways, systems up to TVM-300, TVM-400, and 
ETCS (Levels 1 and 2) build their safety control logic on the basis 
of train position detection information from conventional track 
circuits. Furthermore, as TVM-430, which performs control with 
a smooth speed check pattern, was developed from TVM-300, 
which performs a step-like speed check, the mainstream ap-
proach for the speed check method is to use a single speed check 
pattern. A speed check with a smooth speed restriction pattern is 
also used for the automated train protection function of the ETCS. 
The features of each system are listed in Table 1.
However, for Japan’s digital ATC, ATACS, and so forth, fixed 
railway data, such as speed restriction along with a curve section 
and gradient, and data such as train brake performance are stored 
on the train to generate a reasonable speed check pattern on the 
train. In contrast, many of the European systems receive data such 
as a brake profile from the ground in order to realize ATP control 
with on-board logic. This is one of the issues that requires fur-
ther research when considering the form of future train control 
systems, including tilting control for the performance of vehicle 
tilting control and safety data collection.
3. Proposal of the unified train control system (UTCS)
3.1. Background of the UTCS proposal
The fundamental functions of a train control system are the 
block function and the interlocking function. Aside from the role 
of route arrangement, the most important mission of both func-
tions is to avoid accidents such as train-to-train collisions and 
rear-end collisions. Thus, the principle of ATP, as discussed in the 
cally actuated to slow down the train to a specified speed. Thus, 
ATC, as a machine-initiative system, solved safety problems due 
to human errors by eliminating human operation.
In ATC, an ATC signal that indicates a limit speed, instead of a 
trackside signal, is displayed in the cab. ATC was also installed in 
subway sections where signals are difficult to see, and in conven-
tional high-density railway lines, and demonstrated a high level 
of safety. However, because this method forces a speed check to 
be performed according to the ATC signal, it is disadvantageous 
in that it is necessary to add a new signal to increase the speed. 
As a result, a problem occurred with passenger comfort due to 
repeated motion, such as the brake being actuated, released, and 
actuated again, until the train stopped.
A measure taken as a solution to these problems was to give 
information about a limit section for a running stop by applying 
the concept of the P-type ATS, rather than transmitting a speed 
signal from the ground for safety control. If a speed check pattern 
was generated on the train in conformance with the brake perfor-
mance and so forth of the train, and according to the distance to 
the stop limit point, a continuous single pattern was generated. 
For this reason, transmission information was transferred from 
the ground to the train using a digital telegraph, causing the sys-
tem to be referred to as digital ATC.
The CBTC system, which sends the control telegraph to the 
train via radio waves and acquires the running position from the 
train, was introduced in October 2011 on the Senseki Line under 
the name Advanced Train Administration and Communications 
System (ATACS) and has shown stable operation [2]. ATACS es-
tablished a radio closed-loop control system with a level crossing 
controller to generate a pattern to allow the train to pass through 
the level crossing only after confirming that the level crossing 
gate has been closed and that there are no obstacles. This system 
enhances safety and has also realized a 10 s reduction in closed 
time. In considering UTCS functions, it is also necessary to explore 
smart	solutions	to	key	challenges;	namely,	examining	interface	
information and level crossing control. Fig. 1 shows the evolution 
of these ATP systems in Japan.
Fig. 1. Evolution	of	automatic	train	protection	(ATP)	systems	in	Japan.	AF:	audio	frequency;	ATACS:	Advanced	Train	Administration	and	Communications	System;	ATC:	auto-
matic	train	control;	ATS:	automatic	train	stop;	AWS:	automatic	warning	system;	CARAT:	Computer	and	Radio	Aided	Train	Control	System;	JNR:	Japanese	National	Railways;	 
MFS: multiple frequency shift.
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previous section, has been built on the basis of exclusive control 
for eliminating contact with another train. In the mechanisms 
of various types of ATP, technologies that have been cultivated 
through bitter lessons have accumulated—lessons that have been 
learned through accidents since vehicle transport first began. The 
history of this technological advancement represents the current 
situation of train control systems—in other words, the intricate 
and complete modern block system and interlocking devices that 
have evolved through repeated improvements in a bottom-up 
manner.
Processes commonly included in many devices have proliferat-
ed in the course of developing individual facilities, whereas pro-
cesses that will disappear some day as systems advance have also 
been unveiled. Furthermore, for the purpose of solving problems, 
including the prevention of level crossing accidents, some sys-
tems should be subject to radical and innovative changes in order 
to be effective. In existing signal systems, while train control is 
transmitted via signals, signs, and indicators, train operation 
itself is performed on the basis of information about routes and 
block signals, as well as according to supplementary information 
such as speed restrictions. Of these, information about routes and 
block signals is transmitted to the train in the same information 
format	as	those	of	signal	aspects	and	ATC	signals;	therefore,	pro-
cesses can be standardized. I propose the UTCS based on this way 
of thinking. The UTCS includes not only processing for path allo-
cation but also a function for controlling the point machines and 
level crossings required for path allocation.
3.2. Architecture of the UTCS
Fig. 2 shows the system architecture of the UTCS. The UTCS is 
a hierarchical train control system composed of a central proces-
sor placed in the center (functional layer), an interface-to-device 
unit placed in the field (terminal layer), and a transmission unit 
for information exchange between them (network layer). In the 
UTCS, the logical processing of devices, such as the interlocking 
device, the block system, and the ATP, is aggregated and unified 
in a central processor in the functional layer. As a result, proces-
sors placed in the field are eliminated. In addition, as a result of 
processes being unified in the UTCS, similar functions that are 
currently included in multiple devices, such as the train tracking 
function, are also unified, and the logic can be simplified.
3.3. Outline of the UTCS processes
In the UTCS, the concept of a “path” (labeled “authorized route” 
in Fig. 3) for a train is introduced for the standardization of pro-
cesses. A path means a “limit position to which running is pos-
sible,” and is derived from an associated preceding train, a point 
machine, and the states of a level crossing for each train. For this 
reason, train processes by unified processors are realized by train 
tracking, path searching (or “route searching”), and control pro-
cesses that are initiated by route searching processes in order to 
control level crossings and point machines.
When paths for trains (Train k and Train j in Fig. 3) are deter-
mined, a run command (authorized commandk/j) with additional 
speed restriction information in a path is also generated and sent 
to the corresponding terminal device of the terminal layer.
Path searching creates a search for a limit point to which run-
ning is possible (a path) in the train movement direction. In the 
case of station premises, however, a search is made according to a 
scheduled running path acquired from the running control device 
(or “traffic control system”) on the functional layer. The path at 
this time is based on the terminal end of the running path and is 
determined by the state of point machines existing in between 
and at the tail position of a possible preceding train (including 
the safety margin).
On the other hand, in the case of a midway point between sta-
tions, the tail position of the preceding train or the state (labeled 
“status” in Fig. 3) of an existing level crossing is associated with 
the determination of a path. If the level crossing is controlled 
by the relevant train and the status indicates “passing allowed,” 
which means closing completion and no obstacle, the search is 
extended up to a further remote position.
Although on-board devices are responsible for on-board safety 
processing, a continuous speed check according to a pattern is 
Table 1
Typical ATP systems in Europe.
SNCF(1)
(France)
SNCF(2)
(France)
SNCF(3)
(France)
DB AG
(Germany)
FS
(Italy)
RENFE
(Spain)
Name
TVM-300
(Paris‒Lyon)
TVM-300
(Atlantique)
TVM-430
(LGV Nord)
LZB-80 BACC
CAT
(LZB-80)
Back-up Crocodile — — INDUSI ASFA 200
Max. speed (km·h–1) 270 300 300 250 255 270
Headways (min) 5 4 3 3 5 3
Bidirectional operation Existence Existence Existence Existence Existence Existence
Cab indicator for driver Existence — — Existence Existence Existence
Speed limit Existence — — Existence Existence Existence
Over run protection None existence — — Existence None existence Existence
ATO None existence — — Existence None existence Existence
Insulation of track circuit None insulation — — None insulation None insulation None insulation
Data transmission
Code track circuit + 
barise
— — Loop Code track circuit —
Code 1 of 18 1 of 18 27 bits Max 83 bits 1 of 9 Max 70 bits
Modulation FM — — FSK
50/178 HZ
(AM)
FSK
Fail safety of ground device — — 2 out of 2 2 out of 2 Code-MPU 2 out of 3
Fail safety of cab equipment Fail safe circuit Fail safe circuit Code-MPU 2 out of 3 Code-MPU 2 out of 3
AM:	amplitude	modulation;	ATO:	automatic	train	operation;	FM:	frequency	modulation;	FSK:	frequency-shift	keying;	MPU:	micro	processing	unit.	
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realized on the train anyway. Moreover, in the case of the CBTC, 
a high-level speed check function can be realized by installing a 
terminal device on the train, rather than providing an ATP termi-
nal device on the ground.
4. An Internet Protocol (IP) network responsible for the 
network layer
In realizing the UTCS, the network layer plays an important 
role. An Internet Protocol (IP) network is used as a network for 
the UTCS. Performance requirements for the IP network differ 
depending on the railway section to be used. Because an informa-
tion transmission period of time needs to be guaranteed in a fast 
and highly reliable manner in a high-density railway section, a 
performance-focused network designed specifically for train con-
trol is necessary. In the case of a low-density railway section, on 
the other hand, for which high reliability is required while keep-
ing introduction and maintenance costs under control, it is neces-
sary to consider using a cost-focused general-purpose network. In 
addition, even in a case where a high-density railway section and 
a low-density railway section are connected, easy connection is 
possible because of the connections between IP networks.
4.1. An IP network for high-density railway lines
An IP network for high-density railway lines loop-connects a 
transmission node developed solely for train control via an optical 
line. Each device and a transmission node are then connected via 
an Ethernet line. This IP network can also guarantee a communi-
cation time between transmission nodes and the longest commu-
nication time in a short time period equal to or smaller than 1/10 
of the relaying time period. As a result, each device can realize 
processing with responsiveness equal to or higher than that of a 
relay interface without being conscious of the device-to-device 
physical distance.
Although the IP network is basically built in the form of a sin-
gle configuration, two or more IP networks can be redundantly 
configured in order to enhance the availability factor. Because 
individual IP networks are completely independent of each other, 
forming a parallel dual configuration, the center processor and 
Fig. 2. The architecture of the unified train control system (UTCS).
Fig. 3. An outline of the UTCS processes. CBTC: communication-based train control.
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a terminal device can freely select the route for communica-
tion. Because the availability factor of an IP network is directly 
connected to the system availability factor, attention must also 
be paid to reliability. Hardware for transmission nodes is under 
development, following the signal local area network (LAN) tech-
nology that has in fact been used in many systems, including the 
Tokaido Shinkansen trains.
4.2. An IP network for local railways
Because introduction and maintenance costs are important in 
local railway line sections, a cellphone line, for example, can be 
used as the IP network. Although cellphone lines can reduce high 
cable routing costs, facility costs, and maintenance costs, it is nec-
essary to consider the constraint of a communication time that 
cannot be guaranteed, as well as the communication cost.
When using a cellphone line in a local railway, continuous 
communication becomes difficult. However, a train control sys-
tem that has a function beyond the current level can be realized 
even if the point at which information exchange is performed 
with the center is limited to a neighbor of the station premises 
in a single line section. This has been demonstrated by the de-
velopment of an automatic train protection and block (ATPB) 
system [3].
5. The UTCS serving as an advanced system
The UTCS can realize not only CBTC at low cost but also exist-
ing signal systems, such as the digital ATC, in a simple manner. 
Therefore, an advanced strategy in which digital ATC would be 
temporarily realized under the UTCS and then someday switched 
to the CBTC becomes feasible.
5.1. Changing digital ATC into the communication-based train 
control (CBTC) by the UTCS
Thus far, in order to realize digital ATC, it has been necessary 
to prepare machine rooms in the field, equip the machine rooms 
with large-scale digital ATC ground devices, and connect the 
machine rooms via a network. In order to subsequently evolve 
digital ATC into the CBTC, the logical units of the CBTC would be 
installed separately, and information would be exchanged with 
on-board devices via radio waves. If this was the case, most digi-
tal ATC ground devices (including the logical units in the machine 
rooms) and interlocking devices (including the interfaces to the 
digital ATC) would become obsolete.
On the other hand, for a design taking a future transition to 
the CBTC into account, it would be appropriate to standardize on-
board devices with a patterned safety control processing func-
tion. In other words, such on-board devices could be commonly 
used to handle data, whether digital ATC telegraphs from a power 
receiver or telegraphs from an on-board radio device.
In contrast, in the case of the UTCS, a run command for a 
train is generated as a result of unified processing by the central 
processor at the center. If digital ATC is to be realized under the 
UTCS, the ATC terminal unit should amplify an ATC telegraph on 
the basis of a train run command distributed from the central 
processor and transmit it to the track circuit, as well as perform-
ing train position detection.
For the purpose of a future transition from digital ATC to the 
CBTC under these conditions, ground radio units connected to 
the IP network would perform radio communication with on-
board devices via a terminal device mounted on trains, and would 
transmit and receive a run command and train position informa-
tion from the functional layer. Consequently, the terminal units 
that would become obsolete are limited to the amplifier (AMP) 
and the train detection (TD) for each track circuit, in addition to 
ATC terminal units.
5.2. Effects of the introduction of the UTCS
Because the UTCS allows a large number of facilities to be 
reduced, not only can the facility cost and running cost required 
for the train control system be reduced, but the maintainability, 
reliability, and safety can also be enhanced. For the aggregation of 
logic units, the renovation range at the time of function changes 
and	function	additions	is	based	on	the	center;	hence,	it	becomes	
easy to change a train control system into an evolvable system 
that flexibly adjusts to changing needs. Although it is possible to 
maintain the control configuration of the present signal protec-
tive devices under the UTCS, transition to, for example, the CBTC 
becomes easy by placing terminal devices on the train.
The CBTC realized by the UTCS is a system without a base-
point	control	device	at	a	line	wayside;	therefore,	train	hand-over	
(hand-over processing) between base-point controllers becomes 
unnecessary. In short, the UTCS also serves as a strategy for intro-
ducing the next-generation CBTC and can receive the full benefit 
of the CBTC as-is.
For example, in order to realize the conception of dual-mode 
vehicles (DMVs) and rail buses that can run on both rails and 
roads under the current signal system, it is necessary to harmo-
nize UTCS with the track circuit method by using rail clamping 
via wheels and shafts. Stable train detection with a track circuit is 
also indispensable for realizing free-gauge trains that can freely 
run on Shinkansen lines and conventional railway lines. The UTCS 
becomes a safety system that does not depend on a track circuit, 
removing these constraints simultaneously and allowing a practi-
cal discussion about DMVs and rail buses.
In addition, in order to enhance running density and running 
speed using the current signal system, the division of block sec-
tions, the addition of signal aspects, changes in the aspect system, 
changes in the positions of level crossing controllers, and so forth 
are necessary. However, such enhancement is not possible with 
the current state of things, presenting an obstacle to enhancing 
rail’s competitiveness with automobile transportation and so 
forth. Fortunately, train-based position detection and the realiza-
tion of cab signals that do not depend on a track circuit, as well 
as radio control of level crossings, will eliminate these difficulties 
simultaneously, leading to free enhancement of speed and run-
ning density, and will easily realize performance enhancements 
of traffic systems.
Because the UTCS becomes autonomous on a train, it includes 
on-board continuous position detection as an essential element. 
Track diagnosis information collection with a commercial vehicle 
becomes possible by using this elemental technology, blazing a 
trail for modernized maintenance work [4,5].
With the UTCS, field facilities are reduced compared with 
those	of	existing	train	control	systems;	for	example,	interlocking	
devices in station premises are eliminated. Furthermore, interface 
reduction is advanced, such as integration of the block system 
and the ATP and elimination of the interface units between com-
ponents such as a signal device and the ATP. Equipment savings 
such as these will enhance reliability and maintainability. In ad-
dition, because the probability of malfunctions caused by human 
error at interfaces is reduced, safety advantages are anticipated. 
Thus, the UTCS will contribute to the robustness of railway sys-
tems.
The ultimate architecture of the UTCS will be composed of 
only essential elements such as point machines and level cross-
ing control devices in the field. This approach has been summa-
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rized under the concept of “essential control.” Application of this 
concept will conceivably serve to improve reliability, safety, and 
maintainability, as well as enabling the construction of railway 
systems at low cost.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes a new UTCS, in which a train control sys-
tem is realized in a hierarchical structure of a functional layer, a 
network layer, and a terminal layer, and discusses its processing 
method. It has been demonstrated that an existing signal system 
can be flexibly evolved into an ideal CBTC that does not have a 
base-point controller. While the CBTC will start, for the time be-
ing, with an ATP block system in the form of a minimal system for 
local railway lines, in order to demonstrate its advantages, I will 
endeavor to realize this proposal as soon as possible, as it will be 
effective in enhancing the robustness and competiveness of rail-
way systems. The ATP block system is a good example of realizing 
the essential control concept.
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